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I. INTRODUCTION
There is the possibility that the recent Supreme Court decision of
Ashcroft v. Iqball finally will be the necessary impetus to revisit one of
the more bizarre but enduring canards of American jurisprudence-
the way we interpret the Seventh Amendment's preservation of a
right to a jury trial in federal civil litigation. The Seventh Amend-
ment provides that "[i]n suits at common law ... the right of trial by
jury shall be preserved."2 To this day, the way we apply the Seventh
Amendment-in other words, what we interpret to be the constitu-
tional intent and mandate of our Founders-is to postulate hypotheti-
cally that a contemporary federal civil case, filed in federal district
court under current-day statutes and laws, instead had been filed in
England in 1792, and to ask whether then it would have been filed in
the common law courts or in the equity courts.3 Time and jurispru-
dential evolution have exposed this approach-known as the "histori-
cal test"-as flawed from the inception. Nonetheless, largely through
judicial inertia, the historical test has survived. Indeed, in the
roughly 200 years since the historical test emerged, no occasion has
been sufficient to cause the courts to consider whether the test is juris-
prudentially supportable.
The historical test may well not survive Ashcroft v. Iqbal. On its
face, Iqbal has nothing to do with the Seventh Amendment. Rather,
the opinion addresses pleading standards under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8, and empowers a federal district court in the vast majority
of civil cases to dismiss a lawsuit pre-answer on the basis that the
allegations, while facially sufficient, are conclusory and implausible.
1. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
3. Kenneth S. Klein, The Myth of How to Interpret the Seventh Amendment Right to
a Civil Jury Trial, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1005, 1020-30 (1992) [hereinafter Klein I].
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Iqbal is a none-too-subtle signal from the Court that it is interested in
utilizing Rule 12(b)(6) motions as a gate-keeping device to regulate
potentially frivolous litigation, and thus has re-interpreted Rule 8 to
effectuate this approach. 4 As a result, the Court all but directs dis-
trict trial judges to weigh the factual heft of a complaint early, and to
toss unworthy cases out of court.
In Iqbal there is no mention of the Seventh Amendment. But that
silence can only be maintained for so long. The opinion empowers
judges to invade the constitutionally protected province of the jury.
Or, to put the problem in the terminology and approach of the histori-
cal test, the common law courts of eighteenth century England simply
had no procedural vehicle to weigh the factual allegations of a writ
and dismiss the writ, pre-trial, as implausible.
While the Court does not yet seem to see the Seventh Amendment
problem with Iqbal, eventually it will. Then, the Court finally will
have to revisit the historical test as the interpretive regimen of jury
rights in federal civil litigation, if only to try to enunciate a way to
navigate around it.
It is unlikely that the Court will be able to give due deference si-
multaneously to the history and intent of the Seventh Amendment,
and yet constitutionally empower district courts to weigh evidence at
the pleadings stage of civil litigation. Nonetheless, the attempt should
be the necessary impetus to exposing the historical test as the flawed
jurisprudence it long has been. This Article proposes an alternative
and preferred understanding of the Seventh Amendment.
Part I traces the doctrinal path that leaves us today with the his-
torical test. Part II very briefly reviews the constitutional impasse be-
tween the historical test and Iqbal. Part III presents the case for
abandoning the historical test and proposes a new interpretive rule to
replace it.
II. THE DOCTRINAL PATH TO MEASURING MODERN CIVIL
JURY RIGHTS AND PROCEDURE BY 18TH CENTURY
STANDARDS: AN ABRIDGED HISTORY OF THE SEVENTH
AMENDMENT AND ITS INTERPRETATION
At a minimum, any interpretation of the Seventh Amendment
must not blatantly contradict the original intent of the language.
Also, if one argues (as this Article does) that the historical test is not
consistent with the original intent, one must know that history. For
this reason, the starting point of any proposal to reject the historical
test must be a review of that very test's history.
4. Kenneth S. Klein, Ashcroft v. Iqbal Crashes Rule 8 Pleading Standards on to
Unconstitutional Shores, 88 NEB. L. REV. 261 (2009) [hereinafter Klein II].
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A. The History of the Drafting of the Seventh Amendment
The written record memorializing the emergence of the Seventh
Amendment is scarce.5 But what it reflects is something that rarely
is explicitly acknowledged-the Seventh Amendment is not the result
of a considered philosophical approach to organizing a justice system,
but rather is the result of the authors of the draft Constitution facing
a political problem for which they attempted to craft a political solu-
tion. Succinctly stated, the political problem was that although eight-
eenth century Americans viewed civil juries as a critical check on
government power, they could not agree on the details of how to define
the scope of civil jury rights, and yet they were willing to refuse to
ratify a draft Constitution that omitted any reference to civil juries.6
1. The American Commitment to Civil Juries
The comments of the Founders in the late eighteenth century pro-
vide repeated reference to the importance early Americans placed on
the ideal of the civil jury as a critical check on the power of govern-
ment. Patrick Henry, speaking in the Virginia Constitutional Con-
vention, called civil juries the "best appendage of freedom," one "which
our ancestors secured [with] their lives and property."7 Thomas Jef-
ferson remarked, "I consider trial by jury as the only anchor ever yet
imagined by man, by which a government can be held to the principles
of its constitution."8 Thomas Paine felt civil juries were an extension
of a natural right.9 In his Anti-Federalist writings Judge Samuel
Bryan found civil juries to be crucial:
Judges are likely to have "a bias towards those of their own rank and dignity;
for it is not to be expected, that the few should be attentive to the rights of the
5. The Author has published a previous article specifically on the history of the Sev-
enth Amendment. See Klein I, supra note 3. Portions of this Part of the present
Article are drawn from that article. A comprehensive history of the Seventh
Amendment is not necessary to understand the topics the present Article covers;
however, for thorough histories, see Edith G. Henderson, The Background of the
Seventh Amendment, 80 HARv. L. REV. 289 (1966) and Charles W. Wolfram, The
Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639 (1973).
For a more concise, but still helpful, history of the origins of the civil jury in
Western jurisprudence, see 5 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE 38.02 (2d ed. 1994) and also Jack Pope, The Jury, 39 TEX. L. REV. 426
(1961).
6. Klein I, supra note 3, at 1020.
7. 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 324, 544 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836) [hereinafter ELLIO'S
DEBATES I].
8. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Paine (July 11, 1789), in 15 THE PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 269 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1958). Jefferson would later ex-
press surprise at his perception that the populace would give up the right without
protest. See 1 THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DocuMENTARY HISTORY 609 (Bernard
Schwartz ed., 1971).
9. THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 8, at 316.
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many. This [the civil jury trial] therefore preserves in the hands of the people,
that share which they ought to have in the administration of justice, and pre-
vents the encroachments of the more powerful and wealthy citizens." 1 0
The Federalists opined that eliminating civil jury rights could lead to
insurrection.11 In sum, there was consensus on the importance of civil
juries.
2. The Drafting Dilemma at the Constitutional Convention
At the Constitutional Convention, the devil was in the details. In
Federalist Paper No. 83, which is one of the most extensive contempo-
raneous discussions of jury practice in civil cases, Alexander Hamilton
provided a stark and detailed description of the vast variety of jury
practice among the states:
The great difference between the limits of the jury trial in different States
is not generally understood; . . . In this State, our judicial establishments
resemble, more nearly than any other, those of Great Britain. We have courts
of common law, courts of probate (analogous in certain matters to the spiritual
courts in England), a court of admiralty, and a court of chancery. In the
courts of common law only, the trial by jury prevails, and this with some ex-
ceptions. In all the others a single judge presides, and proceeds in general
either according to the course of the canon or civil law, without the aid of a
jury. In New Jersey, there is a court of chancery which proceeds like ours, but
neither courts of admiralty nor of probate, in the sense in which these last are
established with us. In that State, the courts of common law have the cogni-
zance of those causes which with us are determinable in the courts of admi-
ralty and of probate, and of course the jury trial is more extensive in New
Jersey than in New York. In Pennsylvania, this is perhaps still more the case,
for there is no court of chancery in that State, and its common-law courts have
equity jurisdiction. It has a court of admiralty, but none of probates, at least
on the plan of ours. Delaware has in these respects imitated Pennsylvania.
Maryland approaches more nearly to New York, as does also Virginia, except
that the latter has a plurality of chancellors. North Carolina bears most affin-
ity to Pennsylvania; South Carolina to Virginia. I believe, however, that in
some of those States which have distinct courts of admiralty, the causes de-
pending in them are triable by juries. In Georgia, there are none but common-
law courts, and an appeal of course lies from the verdict of one jury to another,
which is called a special jury, and for which a particular mode of appointment
is marked out. In Connecticut, they have no distinct courts either of chancery
or of admiralty, and their courts of probates have no jurisdiction of causes.
Their common-law courts have admiralty, and, to a certain extent, equity ju-
risdiction. In cases of importance, their General Assembly is the only court of
chancery. In Connecticut, therefore, the trial by jury extends in practice fur-
10. Margaret L. Moses, What the Jury Must Hear: The Supreme Court's Evolving
Seventh Amendment Jurisprudence, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 183, 186 (2000) (quot-
ing Wolfram, supra note 5, at 695-96 (quoting Letters of Centinel, No. II, FREE-
MNi's J. (Philadelphia), Oct. 24, 1787, reprinted in PENNSYLVANIA AND THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, 1787-1788, at 584 (John Bach McMaster & Frederick D.
Stone eds., Lancaster, Historical Society of Pennsylvania 1888))).
11. JAMES IREDELL, ANSWERS TO MR. MASON'S OBJECTIONS TO THE NEW CONSTITU-
TION, 1788, reprinted in PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
362 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1971).
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ther than in any other State yet mentioned. Rhode Island is, I believe, in this
particular, pretty much in the situation of Connecticut. Massachusetts and
New Hampshire, in regard to the blending of law, equity, and admiralty juris-
dictions, are in a similar predicament. In the four Eastern States, the trial by
jury not only stands upon a broader foundation than in the other States, but it
is attended with a peculiarity unknown, in its full extent, to any of them.
There is an appeal of course from one jury to another, til there have been two
verdicts out of three on one side. 1 2
Thus, the Constitutional Convention faced what today would be
recognized at a glance as a classical legislative challenge-how to
build a voting consensus supporting a particular version of draft legis-
lation from a diverse group of legislators. In other words, each of the
States had a different form of civil jury practice, and so to incorporate
any particular extant form of civil jury practice as the model for the
federal courts was to implicitly reject all others. The challenge was to
choose one form without offending proponents of the others.
This was a dilemma indeed for delegates who needed the support
of enough States in order to achieve adoption of the draft Constitution.
The initial solution to this political dilemma was to duck. 13 The text
of the Constitution that went to the States for ratification was silent
on right to trial by jury in civil cases. 14
3. The Political Deal Resulting in the Seventh Amendment
Silence was not golden. When the Constitution was sent to the
states for ratification, it was met with immediate concern that "in civil
causes it did not secure the trial of facts by a jury."15 The Anti-Feder-
alists, who opposed ratification of the Constitution, rallied support by
asserting that the Constitution would abolish civil juries altogether.16
12. THE FEDERALIST No. 83, 501-03 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (footnote omitted).
13. Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 153 n.8 (1973); see also Stanton D. Krauss, The
Original Understanding of the Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial, 33 U.
RICH. L. REV. 407, 411-12 (1999) ("The Convention's failure to create a constitu-
tional right to civil jury trials was part of an even larger political blunder .... ").
14. 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 587-88, 628 (Max Farrand
ed., 1911); see also Wolfram, supra note 5, at 665-66. When Charles Pinckney
reported on the Federal Convention to the ratification debates in South Carolina,
he explained that the Constitution was silent on civil juries because "they found
it impossible to make any precise declaration upon the subject." 4 THE DEBATES
IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITU-
TION 260 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836) [hereinafter ELLIoT'S DEBATES II]. Governor
Edmund Randolph took the same position in the Virginia ratification debates.
ELLIOT'S DEBATES I, supra note 7, at 444.
15. United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745, 750 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 16,750).
16. See Henderson, supra note 5, at 292; see also Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. 433, 446
(1830) ("One of the strongest objections originally taken against the Constitution
of the United States, was the want of an express provision securing the right of
trial by jury in civil cases.").
[Vol. 88:467
2010] DEATH (FINALLY) FOR THE "HISTORICAL TEST" 473
Professor Henderson summarizes the divisiveness created over reten-
tion of a constitutional right to jury trials:
Within a month the whole country was divided into Federalist and Anti-Fed-
eralist parties. The almost complete lack of any bill of rights was a principal
part of the Anti-Federalist argument; the lack of provision for civil juries was
a prominent part of this argument, and the Supreme Court's appellate juris-
diction in law and in fact was treated by the Anti-Federalists as a virtual
abolition of the civil jury.17
When Hamilton reflected on the entire range of stated objections to
the Constitution, he surmised that the one which met with the most
success in his state, "and perhaps in several of the other States, is that
relative to the want of a constitutional provision for the trial by jury in
civil cases."l 8
In exchange for a promise by the first Congress to pass a declara-
tion of individual rights as amendments to the Constitution, the Anti-
Federalists allowed nine states to approve the Constitution. 19 Of the
seven states that proposed amendments, six proposed language pro-
tecting civil jury rights. 2 0 The proposed amendments evolved, of
course, into the Bill of Rights.21 The Federalists were committed to
pass these amendments in the First Congress to avoid convening a
second constitutional convention. 22
4. The Drafting and Adoption of the Seventh Amendment
The second attempt to solve the political problem was to opt, in lieu
of ducking altogether, to evade through ambiguity. James Madison
was the first to introduce a draft of a bill of rights. 23 One of his pro-
posed provisions was the clear predecessor of the eventual final lan-
guage of the Seventh Amendment: "In suits at common law, between
man and man, the trial by jury, as one of the best securities to the
rights of the people, ought to remain inviolate."24
The key language in Madison's proposal is "In suits at common
law." Even before the First Congress, Alexander Hamilton recognized
17. Henderson, supra note 5, at 295.
18. THE FEDERALIST No. 83., supra note 12, at 495. At the time of the consideration
of the proposed Constitution, of all of the rights later enshrined in the Bill of
Rights, "[t]he right to trial by jury was probably the only one universally secured
by the first American state constitutions." LEONARD LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRES-
SION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY 281 (1960).
19. Wolfram, supra note 5, at 725.
20. JAMES MADISON, DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION OF THE CONSTITU-
TION, H.R. Doc. No. 69-398, at 1018-19, 1024-26, 1028-29, 1034-36, 1044-46,
1052-54 (1927) (Massachusettes, New Hampshire, Virginia, New York, North
Carolina, and Rhode Island, respectively) (1927).
21. Wolfram, supra note 5, at 725.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 726-27.
24. Id. at 727-28 (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 435 (Joseph Gales ed. 1834)).
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the problem with language that defined the right to a jury trial by
reference to "common law"-the language let each reader see the
meaning they chose, because of the lack of shared definition of the
phrase. 25 Hamilton's criticism was echoed in the First Congress. Fed-
eralist Samuel Livermore, former Chief Justice of New Hampshire,
strongly opposed Madison's version of the Bill of Rights, and in partic-
ular the language used in the Seventh Amendment. 26 He enunciated
the basic concern that not every case was best decided by a jury.27
But Madison won and Livermore lost; the Seventh Amendment was
adopted, stating:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by jury
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than ac-
cording to the rules of common law.2 8
One of the Federalists predicted what would necessarily follow: "A
general declaration ... to preserve the trial by jury in all civil cases
[will] produce[ confusion, so that the courts afterwards in a thousand
instances [will] not know[ ] how to ... proceede[ ]."29 Given the draft-
ing approach of Madison, this was a serious concern. But that writer
did not anticipate that the first of those potential thousand instances
would fall to the legendary Justice Joseph Story.
B. The Emergence Of, And Continued Loyalty To, the
"Historical Test" For Interpreting the Seventh
Amendment
1. The Creation of the Historical Test for Interpreting the
Seventh Amendment
Twenty-one years after the adoption of the Seventh Amendment, a
case brought the issue of the scope of the amendment to the doorstep
of Justice Story. In United States v. Wonson, Samuel Wonson was
prosecuted for failing to pay penalties in accordance with the Embargo
Supplementary Act of 1808.30 Mr. Wonson won at the trial court
level, and the Government appealed. Justice Story was asked to de-
cide "whether the facts are again to be submitted to a jury in this
court, or the appeal submits questions of law only for the considera-
25. THE FEDERALIST No. 83, supra note 12, at 523-28.
26. Wolfram, supra note 5, at 727-28 & n.259.
27. Id. at 728-29.
28. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
29. IREDELL, supra note 11, at 361.
30. 28 F. Cas. 745 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 16,750).
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tion of the court."31 Justice Story found that the legislation creating
appellate jurisdiction rejected the notion of a second jury.32
Justice Story then turned to the constitutional clauses regarding
appeals. There is at least some debate to this day about precisely
what Justice Story intended when he decided this issue.3 3 But taking
the decision at face value, Justice Story took on a task akin to pinning
a wave to the shore-he sought to read the Seventh Amendment as
describing and constitutionally enshrining a black letter rule of law,
even though for political reasons the intention of the language was
precisely the opposite. After all, Justice Story had an actual case he
had to decide.34
Justice Story reasoned that the Seventh Amendment was specifi-
cally crafted to restrict the higher courts from nullifying the jury ver-
dicts of the lower courts. 35 More importantly, he recognized the
States' deep interest in the subject of civil jury rights at the time of the
drafting of the Seventh Amendment.36 He concluded that this gave
insight into the "scope and object of the amendment." 37
Justice Story then turned to grappling in particular with the
phrase "common law." Federalist No. 83, with which Justice Story
was familiar,3S made clear that if "common law" was read as a refer-
ence to American practice, then it provided no guideline at all. Conse-
quently, Justice Story concluded that "common law" referred to the
law of England, which he considered the only other theoretically avail-
able solution:
Beyond all question, the common law here alluded to is not the common law of
any individual state, (for it probably differs in all) but it is the common law of
England, the grand reservoir of all our jurisprudence. It cannot be necessary
for me to expound the grounds of this opinion, because they must be obvious to
every person acquainted with the history of the law. 3 9
31. Id. Justice Story recounts how at least some states did have the practice of sec-
ond juries on appeal. Id. at 748.
32. Id. at 749-50.
33. Kraus, supra note 13, at 460-75.
34. Justice Story apparently never considered that he could have taken the approach
that the second clause of the Seventh Amendment (addressing review ofjury ver-
dicts) was not restricted by the usage in the first clause of the phrase "common
law."




38. He cited it within his opinion. Id.
39. Id. If Justice Story had tried to explain the basis for his assertion that "common
law" referred to England, he would have found the task nearly impossible. There
is no recorded legislative history suggesting that the phrase "common law" re-
ferred to the common law of England. Nor is support found in the records of the
state debates, the Federalist Papers, or the writings of commentators of the time.
Indeed, Hamilton's concerns seem to suggest the opposite. THE FEDERALIST No.
475
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Today, at least one scholar cogently argues that Justice Story's in-
tentions have been misunderstood.40 Nonetheless, the conventional
understanding of Wonson-interpreting the Seventh Amendment as a
static constitutional enshrinement of English common law jury
rights-has been the law for nearly two hundred years. As Professor
Wolfram notes, "No federal case decided after Wonson seems to have
challenged this sweeping proclamation; perhaps later judges have
hesitated to appear to be the kind of intractable person that would
require Mr. Justice Story to elaborate on the obvious."41
The Wonson interpretation of the Seventh Amendment became
known as the "historical test."4 2 Under the historical test, in order to
determine whether a civil case carries a jury right, one must ask if the
claimant would have a right to a jury trial according to English com-
mon law principles. If there was any doubt that this test incorporated
the English practice of a fixed point in time, that was clarified in 1898,
when the Supreme Court expressly recognized that the Sixth and Sev-
enth Amendment's phrase "trial by jury" not only meant that a case
should be compared to English practice, but also that the comparison
was fixed in time to English practice in 1791.43
2. The Resilience of the Historical Test
In the near two-hundred years since Wonson, a handful of scholars
(including this writer) have discussed, criticized, defended, and ridi-
culed the historical test and the accuracy of the understanding of orig-
inal intent it rests upon.44 Nevertheless, courts have remained
steadfast to the notion that the Seventh Amendment is a constitu-
tional preservation of the civil jury as it existed at common law in
England in 1791.45
83, supra note 12. Justice Story's assertion had no documentable basis. See
David L. Shapiro & Daniel R. Coquillette, The Fetish of Jury Trial in Civil Cases:
A Comment on Rachal v. Hill, 85 HARv. L. REV. 442, 448-49 (1971).
40. Kraus, supra note 13, at 460-75.
41. Wolfram, supra note 5, at 641.
42. See, e.g., id., at 639-40.
43. Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 350 (1898). See also Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S.
474, 476 (1935) (holding that courts must look to the common law at the time of
the adoption of the Bill of Rights in 1791).
44. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
(1998) [hereinafter AMAR I]; KLEIN I, supra note 3; Rachael E. Schwartz, "Every-
thing Depends on How You Draw the Lines": An Alternative Interpretation of the
Seventh Amendment, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 599 (1996).
45. An excellent review of the post-Wonson jurisprudence and the inroads it has, and
has not, made on the historical test is found in Moses, supra note 10, which re-
views whether the Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996),
decision, holding that claim construction of patents is not a jury issue, forebodes
the end of the historical test, and concludes it does not.
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The loyalty of historical test supporters has not come easy-requir-
ing instead increasingly abstract comparisons of modern day litigation
to eighteenth century England. Recent cases are indicative of the
reaches the U.S. Supreme Court has had to make to find analogs be-
tween contemporary causes of action and eighteenth century English
writs. In Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry,
the Justices argued over whether the common law action for attorney
malpractice or the equitable action for breach of fiduciary duty was a
closer eighteenth century English equivalent to a modern suit by an
employee for back pay arising out of a union's breach of duty of fair
representation.46 In Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., the
Court concluded there was a 1791 English common law analog to a
1976 United States statute creating a right to damages for copyright
infringement.47 In Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg,48 the Court per-
formed all sorts of jurisprudential gymnastics in order to hold that
bankruptcy proceedings did not carry the right to a jury trial.49 In
City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., the Court
found that a section 1983 claim protesting a municipal exercise of emi-
nent domain was analogous to a 1791 English common law tort ac-
tion. 50 In Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., the Court found
that while a case for patent infringement did carry a jury right, the
construction of claims terms in the patent did not.5 1
The above cases are just a handful of examples of the historical test
surviving, even at the resulting cost of fantastical jurisprudence. 52
There is sporadic academic debate over Justice Story's interpretation
of the history underlying the Seventh Amendment and over whether
the static historical test is even what Justice Story intended. There is
no debate that it is what we now have.53
Amidst the sporadic academic debate, the Court has only even
slightly wavered but once. In Ross v. Bernhard, the Court hinted that
there might be a complexity exception to the Seventh Amendment. 54
While this triggered an academic debate over the desirability of such
46. 494 U.S. 558, 567-68, 584 (1990).
47. 523 U.S. 340, 348-49 (1998).
48. 492 U.S. 33 (1989).
49. Kenneth S. Klein, The Validity of the Public Rights Doctrine in Light of the His-
torical Rationale of the Seventh Amendment, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1013,
1034-38 (1994).
50. 526 U.S. 687, 708-09 (1999).
51. 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996).
52. See, e.g., Klein I, supra note 3; Schwartz, supra note 44; Ellen E. Sward, The
Seventh Amendment and the Alchemy of Law and Fact, 33 SETON HALL L. REV.
573 (2003).
53. See Moses, supra note 10, at 187-88.
54. 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970).
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an exception, 5 5 in the end the Court hewed the line to the historical
test.56
One way to think about and appreciate the resiliency of the histori-
cal test is to note that its legal pedigree is only nine years less than
that of Marbury v. Madison.57 Why has the Court remained true to
the historical test even in the face of the resulting convoluted jurispru-
dence? As then Associate Justice Rehnquist observed, while the
"rigid" application of the Seventh Amendment might be "burden-
some," "it is the Constitution which commands that rigidity."58
If the Constitution does, in fact, command that rigidity, then Jus-
tice Rehnquist was correct-we must live with the increasingly bur-
densome historical test. But if that is a misreading of the Seventh
Amendment, then one is reminded of the first law of holes: when you
find yourself in a hole, stop digging.59
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF ASHCROFT V. IQBAL ON THE
SEVENTH AMENDMENT
While the historical test is most often thought of as the measure of
when a cause of action carries a jury trial right, it also serves as the
measure of procedural reforms that arguably infringe on the role of
the jury. In evaluating procedural reforms through a Seventh Amend-
ment lens, the Court's approach has not been to look for a precise pro-
cedural equivalent in eighteenth century English common law, but
rather to measure whether the reform had an analogous eighteenth
century English common law procedure in effect; in other words,
whether the contemporary procedure encroached on the traditional
role and prerogative of a jury.60 For example, in Galloway v. United
States (the opinion most often cited for this approach), the Court held
that a directed verdict was appropriate under the historical test be-
55. See, e.g., Morris S. Arnold, A Modest Replication to a Lengthy Discourse, 128 U.
PA. L. REV. 986 (1980); Morris S. Arnold, A Historical Inquiry Into the Right to
Trial by Jury in Complex Civil Litigation, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 829 (1980); James S.
Campbell & Nicholas Le Poidevin, Complex Cases and Jury Trials: A Reply to
Professor Arnold, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 965 (1980); Patrick Devlin, Jury Trial of
Complex Cases: English Practice at the Time of the Seventh Amendment, 80
COLUM. L. REV. 43 (1980); Douglas King, Complex Civil Litigation and the Sev-
enth Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, 51 U. CH. L. REV. 581 (1984).
56. See, e.g., Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 418 n.4 (1987) ("The Court has also
considered the practical limitations of a jury .... But the Court has not used
these considerations as an independent basis for extending the right to a jury
trial under the Seventh Amendment."); Wolfram, supra note 5, at 648-49.
57. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
58. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 346-50 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
59. THE PENGUIN DICTIONARY OF MODERN HUMOROUS QUOTATIONS 194 (Fred Metcalf
ed., 1986) (quoting Denis Healey).
60. See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 336-37.
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cause it had a procedural equivalent in eighteenth century English
common law. 6 1 Dimick v. Schiedt held that an appellate court condi-
tioning reversal on a defendant's declination of an additur violated the
Seventh Amendment because of the absence of an English judge hav-
ing a similar right in 1791 England.62 Ex Parte Peterson approved a
trial court retention of a financial auditor to report on and simplify
issues for a jury, finding the auditor served a role similar to the role of
pleadings in the common law in that it focused and simplified matters
for the jury.6 3 Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. United States
approved of summary judgment as permitted by the Seventh Amend-
ment because it was equivalent to the common law demurrer to the
evidence. 6 4
It is in this context that Iqbal collides with the Seventh Amend-
ment. In Iqbal, the Court addressed pleading standards under Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 8.65 There are some civil cases with
special pleading rules. Rule 9 sets a special standard for pleading
fraud.66 The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act67 sets special
61. 319 U.S. 372, 389-90 (1943). For a more detailed discussion of exactly what Gal-
loway did and did not hold, see Klein II, supra note 4, at 278-83.
62. 293 U.S. at 482-87 (1935). A useful, in depth, and ultimately critical analysis of
the Court's opinion in Dimick is Suja A. Thomas, Re-Examining the Constitution-
ality of Remittitur Under the Seventh Amendment, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 731 (2003).
63. 253 U.S. 300, 308-10 (1920).
64. 187 U.S. 315 (1902). See also, Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 158-60 (1973)
(the Court approved of six-person jury panels because it did not implicate the
power or role of the jury); Walker v. N.M. & S. Pac. R.R. Co., 165 U.S. 593, 594-96
(1897) (the procedure of the special verdict did not violate the Seventh Amend-
ment "[s]o long as this substance of right is preserved the procedure by which this
result shall be reached is wholly within the discretion of the legislature, and the
courts may not set aside any legislative provision in this respect because the form
of action-the mere manner in which questions are submitted-is different from
that which obtained at the common law"). There also are cases approving proce-
dural devices that had no eighteenth century English common law analog, but
can be explained on the basis that the procedures were forms of review of juries
(the second clause of the Seventh Amendment speaks to review of jury verdicts
and is not textually grounded in the "common law"). Thus, in Gasoline Products
Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., the Court rejected a claim for retrial on both liabil-
ity and damages, and instead held (even though this was not an available proce-
dure at common law in 1791) that an appellate court could set aside a verdict in
part. 283 U.S. 494, 499 (1931) (affirming the verdict on liability, but remanding
for a new trial on damages due to an erroneous jury instruction on damages).
The Court held the Seventh Amendment was concerned with substance, not form,
and the substance preserved was the right of the jury to decide all issues of fact
(and the jury had decided liability in the first verdict). Id. Similarly, Capital
Traction Co. v. Hof recognized the power of the legislature to pass a statute em-
panelling an appellate jury to review a jury trial held before a justice of the peace,
even though no such procedure existed at common law in England. 174 U.S. 1,
38-39 (1899).
65. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 1953 (2009).
66. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
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standards for pleading securities class actions. However, the over-
whelming majority of civil cases in federal court simply must meet the
"short and plain statement" standard of Rule 8.68 Under Conley v.
Gibson,6 9 this standard has long been the "no set of facts" standard,
also known as "notice pleading."7 0
In Iqbal, the Court implicitly rejected notice pleading, holding that
any complaint subject to Rule 8 should have its allegations divided
into those which are "conclusory" and those which are not.7 1 As to the
former, the district court should review them under the lens of the
trial judge's experience and common sense to determine if the allega-
tions are plausible.72 If the court finds these allegations are not plau-
sible, then the case should be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6).73
The crux of this analytical approach, of course, turns on the Court's
meaning of the word "conclusory." If one focuses on the facts of Iqbal,
it seems that what is meant by "conclusory" is any complaint that does
not have in hand, and plead, the equivalent of smoking gun evidence.
Since virtually all civil cases depend to one degree or another on the
discovery process-it is the rare plaintiff who comes to the courthouse
with a lay down hand before suing-this subjects virtually all civil
cases to a trial court's whims and instincts on plausibility, and essen-
tially insulates that conclusion from appellate reversal.74
The underlying logic of Iqbal is that it empowers a trial judge to act
as an early gatekeeper to dismiss possibly frivolous litigation before
too much cost is imposed by discovery. 75 The Court has identified a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion as the correct tool to achieve this goal, and thus
has interpreted Rule 8 in such a way as to give that tool a target rich
environment. 7 6
But there is no way to evaluate the plausibility of factual allega-
tions without that effort constituting a weighing of evidence.7 7 And
there is no way to characterize a dismissal on the basis of a weighing
of the evidence as anything other than taking the prerogative of
weighing controverted evidence away from the jury.7 8 That is not a
power that was available to an eighteenth century English Common
67. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(c) (2006).
68. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
69. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
70. Klein II, supra note 4, at 267-68.
71. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-50 (2009).
72. Id. at 1950.
73. Id.
74. Klein II, supra note 4, at 274.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 276.
78 Id.
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Law judge.79 That is why Iqbal inevitably clashes with the Seventh
Amendment.8 0
While the evolution of litigation has increasingly made the histori-
cal test anachronistic, it is rare that the Court has actually had to
square up to this fact. Thus far, the historical test has never put a
jurisprudential goal of the Court at unavoidable odds with eighteenth
century English practice. But Iqbal does present that impasse. It now
seems inevitable that as a result of Iqbal, the Court will have to ad-
dress the viability of the historical test for the first time since Wonson.
IV. IT IS TIME TO ABANDON THE HISTORICAL TEST
When the Court revisits the historical test, it should abandon it.
The test is a misreading of constitutional intent. And from that comes
the question the Court never has addressed-what reading of the Sev-
enth Amendment should replace the historical test?
A. The Historical Test Is a Misreading of Constitutional
Intent
The historical test has been flawed from inception. Either Justice
Story never intended to create a static interpretation of the Seventh
Amendment, 8 1 or Justice Story had a failure of imagination in
prognosticating the mischief his rule would create. Put another way,
one is left to wonder precisely why "later judges have hesitated to ap-
pear to be the kind of intractable person that would require Mr. Jus-
tice Story to elaborate on the obvious."8 2
Frankly, it is hard to come up with an answer beyond some combi-
nation of inertia and legend. Like the call of the mermaid, one wishes
to ascribe great wisdom and lofty goals to each word in the now centu-
ries old Constitution. And just as one may run aground on the rocks
rather than see that the siren song is not coming from a mermaid, but
a manatee, one may live with absurd law rather than see the Foun-
ders as political actors acting with pedestrian political motives. But
what would we conclude about the Framers' intentions if we could
step back, clear our minds of preconception, and simply read the
Founders' contemporaneous words about what they were doing, and
why they were doing it?83
79. Id. at 283.
80. Id. at 287.
81. Krauss, supra note 13, at 460-78.
82. Wolfram, supra note 5, at 641. See Henderson, supra note 5, at 292.
83. Mark Twain once said, "It ain't what you don't know that gets you into trouble.
It's what you know for sure that just ain't so." BrainyQuote.com, http://
www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/m/marktwainl09624.html (last visited Oct.
2, 2009).
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The history of the Seventh Amendment describes a group of politi-
cians addressing a political problem by navigating to a political solu-
tion.84 Unburdened by preconception, contemporary political
scientists would see it at a glance, just by reading the contemporane-
ous words of the Founders. They describe how at the Constitutional
Convention, the Framers knew that the nascent nation cherished jury
rights in civil trials, but they could not come to an agreement on the
precise parameters of those rights.85 They describe how they found it
an impossible task to choose a precise form of jury rights to be pre-
served in the draft Constitution without risking alienating so many
states that it imperiled adoption.8 6 They describe how they decided to
leave the document silent on the issue, in the hope that no one would
question their intentions.8 7 They describe how that hope failed, and
how they then committed to address the issue in immediate amend-
ments to the Constitution, if the Constitution was adopted.88 And
they describe how at the stage of drafting those amendments, the ini-
tial problem had not changed.8 9
Through all of this the drafters of the Seventh Amendment were
cobbling together a political majority-they were vote counters. It
would seem inescapable, in light of this history, that the resulting lan-
guage of the Seventh Amendment was a salve, but not a solution. Put
another way, because it was politically necessary, the Seventh
Amendment intentionally was not a choice of a definitive rule of law
concretely defining the precise contours of the preservation of civil
84. As Professor Krauss notes, for example, "only by promising to support amend-
ments did men like James Madison win election to the First Congress." Krauss,
supra note 13, at 412.
85. For example, the Federalists acknowledged that a Constitution that eliminated
civil jury rights could lead to insurrection. IREDELL, supra note 11. During the
Constitutional Convention, Mr. Gerry "urged the necessity of Juries to guard
[against] corrupt Judges," to which Colonel Mason responded, "[tihe jury cases
cannot be specified." 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at
587 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).
86. For example, Alexander Hamilton said, "no general rule could have been fixed
upon by the convention which would have corresponded with the circumstances
of all the States .... ." THE FEDERALIST No. 83, supra note 12, at 525. As one of
the Federalists amplified, "[a] general declaration therefore to preserve the trial
by jury in all civil cases would only have produced confusion . . . because there
has been no uniform custom about it. If therefore the Convention had inter-
fered .... if they had pleased some States they must have displeased others."
THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 8, at 454.
87. For example, when General Pinckney reported on the Federal Convention to the
ratification debates in South Carolina, he explained that the Constitution was
silent on civil juries because "they found it impossible to make any precise decla-
ration upon the subject." ELLIOT'S DEBATES II, supra note 14, at 253, 260. Mr.
Randolph took the same position in the Virginia ratification debates. ELLIOT'S
DEBATES I, supra note 7, at 463, 468.
88. Wolfram, supra note 5, at 725.
89. Klein I, supra note 3, at 1016-20.
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jury rights. Unfortunately, that political solution is what has led to
the contemporary problem.
B. The Historical Test Should Be Abandoned
The historical test rests on discredited approaches of constitutional
interpretation. The basic interpretive approach of the historical test
is that the term "common law" had a static meaning in 1791; the his-
tory of the drafting of the Seventh Amendment can tell us what that
static meaning is; and therefore because of that history, we are bound
to that static meaning in interpreting the Seventh Amendment today.
The contemporary Supreme Court rejects as essentially absurd an
approach of constitutional interpretation binding future generations
to the precise meaning of a noun as it was defined in the eighteenth
century. As even the staunchest originalist, Justice Scalia, wrote for a
majority of the Court recently interpreting the word "arms" in the Sec-
ond Amendment:
Some have made the argument, bordering on the frivolous, that only those
arms in existence in the 18th century are protected by the Second Amend-
ment. We do not interpret constitutional rights that way. Just as the First
Amendment protects modern forms of communications, and the Fourth
Amendment applies to modern forms of search, the Second Amendment ex-
tends, prima facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms, even
those that were not in existence at the time of the founding.9 0
Similarly, the contemporary Supreme Court rejects the notion that
historical intent, assuming it can ever be accurately ascertained, be-
comes an inflexible barrier to an evolving understanding of constitu-
tional rights. Rather, as Justice Kennedy wrote for the majority of the
Court when dealing with Texas' laws regulating homosexual relation-
ships, history is informative, but not controlling, when interpreting
the Constitution.9 1 There, the Court recognized that the fact that the
law at issue certainly would have passed constitutional muster at the
time of the founding of the Nation was insufficient to save the law
from falling to evolving constitutional norms two centuries later.9 2
With these holdings in mind all three legs supporting the stool of
the historical test are now gone. The drafters did not intend the words
"common law" to refer to 1791 English common law. If they had so
intended, that would not bind future generations to that static in time
reference. And even if the intent had been to have the reference static
and binding, it would not immunize the Seventh Amendment from
evolving views of the role of civil juries. Indeed, imagine the irony of
the contrary conclusion: facially static terms in the Constitution-
90. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2791-92 (2008) (emphasis added)
(citations omitted).
91. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567-74 (2003) (citations omitted).
92. Id. at 568-79.
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"arms," "free speech," and "search"-in fact evolve and expand with
the development of society, but the term "common law," which is un-
derstood to describe either a court system or jurisprudential approach
through which law develops incrementally over time, is treated as for-
ever static and binding in its reference. There is no interpretive para-
digm or principle of jurisprudence I can identify to support this
oxymoron.
The increasingly uncomfortable analysis the Court has engaged in
to remain true to the historical test aptly demonstrates the peril of
losing sight of these lessons. The problems on the horizon as a result
of Iqbal loom even larger.93 It would seem that regardless of one's
jurisprudential approach to constitutional interpretation, the histori-
cal test should have no friends. The historical test must be
abandoned.
C. A Proposal for a New Interpretive Approach to the
Seventh Amendment
There is scant discussion of what might be a more defensible inter-
pretation of the Seventh Amendment. Even in academic circles, ques-
tioning Justice Story's reading of constitutional intent has been a rare
exercise. The proposals in lieu of the historical test (other than this
Author's own work in 199294) take three forms. One is reading the
Seventh Amendment as enshrining an Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins-
like rule, preserving jury rights in civil cases in federal court as they
exist in the forum state of that court. 95 Another argues that the Sev-
enth Amendment is a grant of power to Congress to define civil jury
rights in civil cases as Congress sees fit.96 A third approach interprets
Seventh Amendment original intent as preserving jury rights except
in cases in which a jury would be an "inappropriate fact-finding
body."97
None of these interpretations is satisfactory. Of the three, the Erie
interpretation is the most attractive because it rests on a documentary
record that certainly can be read as supporting this intention. 98 In
essence, the argument is that the record reflects both a diversity of
practice among the states and the intent that there be no encroach-
ment on this practice, and so an Erie-type interpretation would
93. Klein II, supra note 4.
94. Klein I, supra note 3, at 1034-35.
95. AmAR I, supra note 44, at 88-93. To a Civil Procedure professor such as myself,
there would be delicious irony in using an Erie-like approach in lieu of Wonson,
since Erie itself overturned one of Justice Story's other monumental opinions-
Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842). Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 71-78
(1938).
96. Krauss, supra note 13, at 479-83; Schwartz, supra note 44, at 616-22.
97. King, supra note 55, at 608-13.
98. AMAR I, supra note 44, at 89-91.
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achieve this result. This interpretation nonetheless has a problem I
have difficulty surmounting. As the opinion in Wonson reflects, Jus-
tice Story was well aware that the states had widely divergent jury
practices, and that the animating concern underlying the Seventh
Amendment was the preservation of jury rights. This was the conun-
drum he had to resolve to decide the case, and is the reason he enunci-
ated the interpretation that the Seventh Amendment was a reference
to England. Justice Story was a contemporary of the gentlemen who
advocated for and wrote the Seventh Amendment. So if, as Professor
Amar argues, those gentlemen had conceived of and been explicit in
their intention that the Seventh Amendment directed each federal
court to apply the preservation of jury rights of that court's forum
state, then I have no explanation for why this was lost on Justice
Story. It certainly would have been an easier solution.
The interpretation that the Seventh Amendment did not provide
any legal mandate, but rather gave a jury right "whenever Congress
deigned to allow them," is explicitly grounded in the premise that the
Seventh Amendment reflects a purely precatory principle aimed sim-
ply at "calming" the general populace, rather than mandatory protec-
tion of a cherished right. 99 I reject the notion that directive text in the
Constitution, which on its face is restrictive and mandatory, can be
reduced to aspirational, non-binding, and of no legal effect.10 0
The interpretation that the Seventh Amendment is an attempt to
recognize and utilize the different skill sets of judges and juries, and
apportion to each responsibility for those cases for which each is most
appropriate, has a different problem. 1 0 ' As the proponent of this ap-
proach concedes, it rests on seeing a tacit, but unspoken, assumption
behind the text.102 From this assumption it is argued that the Foun-
ders foresaw the future, radical evolution of the law and intended to
not tie the hands of future courts to the procedure of using juries,
come what may.1 0 3 The word "tacit" is telling. There simply is no doc-
umentary support for this interpretation.
Professor Lawrence Lessig in 1993 described a mode of constitu-
tional interpretation which he called "translation," meaning "to
change one text into another text, while preserving the original text's
meaning.1O4 Under this mode, one would seek a way to translate the
Seventh Amendment reference to "common law" that serves modern
forms of civil litigation while not abusing the original intent. This is a
99. Krauss, supra note 13, at 479-81; Schwartz, supra note 44, at 610-11, 616-17.
100. Klein I, supra note 3, at 1033.
101. An excellent discussion of the additional challenge this approach raises is found
in Sward, supra note 52.
102. King, supra note 55, at 611-12.
103. Id.
104. Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEx. L. REV. 1165, 1172-73 (1993).
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particularly apt approach to the Seventh Amendment, since its his-
tory reflects an intent to craft a political solution, rather than a doctri-
nal rule, and so searching for an actual intended rule of law is not a
productive exercise. One year before publication of Professor Lessig's
work, I inadvertently applied this same basic approach to interpreting
the Seventh Amendment.105 At that time, I concluded that there were
two possible meanings of "common law" that would be true to original
intent: "common law" in juxtaposition to equity or "common law" in
juxtaposition to statutory law.1 0 6 I concluded that the latter interpre-
tation was preferable, because while the former was probably more
like what the Founders had in mind, it also was the interpretation the
historical test rested upon, and time had demonstrated the historical
test as unworkable.107
Now, seventeen years later, I think my initial conclusion-that one
could not simultaneously avoid the problems of the historical test and
translate "common law" in juxtaposition to equity-was too hasty.
There is a way. The starting point is to remind ourselves of the core,
animating principle of the Seventh Amendment. The absence of a con-
stitutional provision preserving jury rights almost kept the Constitu-
tion from being adopted at all. The original intent was clear-to
preserve the role of civil juries (the embodiment of citizen democracy
in the civil courtroom) as the broadly empowered institution that it
was throughout all of the states.
Although I did not perceive it in 1992, there is a way to be true to
the original intent, and to be true to the most prevalent eighteenth
century meaning of the term "common law"-which is in juxtaposition
to equity-and yet still avoid the problems of the historical test. That
way is to approach the definition, for purposes of the Seventh Amend-
ment, from the other side of the coin-to read "common law" as "not
equity," or phrased slightly differently, as "not chancery courts."
At the time of the drafting and adoption of the Seventh Amend-
ment, all civil court systems were bifurcated into common law courts
and chancery courts. That division was well understood by any law-
yer of the day, and so one would be describing the exact same sphere
of responsibility whether using the phrasing "common law" or the
phrasing "not chancery." For James Madison-even if he did consider
whether to phrase the Seventh Amendment one way versus the other
(there is no evidence that he did)-because the choice would not result
in a difference in content, using "common law" was certainly the
phrasing that was least awkward.
With the merger of law and equity, coupled with more than two
centuries of evolution of legal rights, the meaning of those two phras-
105. Klein I, supra note 3, at 1032-35.
106. Id. at 1034.
107. Id. at 1034-35.
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ings has diverged. Ironically, if one today were trying to make juries
the norm rather than the exception, that intent would be better served
by the phrasing "not chancery." Time has exposed the consequence of
defining jury rights by reference to the old sphere of responsibility of
the common law courts, rather than the chancery courts. It results in
a gradual but resolute contraction of jury rights.108 Thus, as a start-
ing point, to be true to the intent of broadly giving citizens a role in the
courts through the institution of civil juries, "common law" ideally
would have been understood to mean anything not in the sphere of
chancery court responsibility, rather than that which was within the
sphere of common law court responsibility.
But which chancery court system would be the point of reference?
Put another way, why was I wrong in 1992 when I wrote that this
interpretation would recreate the same problem into which Justice
Story fell? After all, the problem Justice Story wrestled with-that
the states all drew the lines between common law and equity differ-
ently-is no less challenging if one looks at the chancery courts than if
one looks at the common law courts. Justice Story simply could not
see a way to solve the problem but to bluster, without support, that
the reference was to England. There was, however, another choice.
What is certain is that by "preserving" jury rights, the Seventh
Amendment does not anticipate a scope of jury rights below a floor as
defined by the most crimped range of those rights among the then-
existing states. Thus, for Justice Story, he could (and should) have
held that "common law" meant, at a minimum, the range of cases from
the then-existing state systems that were within the scope of responsi-
bility of the common law courts as that scope was the most narrowly
defined within those state systems. Or, if one today were to interpret
"common law" as "not chancery," the point of reference would be the
sphere of responsibility of the chancery courts in the broadest of the
then-existing state systems. This would be a translation consistent
with the word "preserved" within the Seventh Amendment.
While not immediately apparent, this proposed "translation" of the
Seventh Amendment-that it preserves the right to civil juries except
in cases that would have been in the sphere of responsibility of the
chancery courts in the broadest of the state systems as such systems
existed in 1791-is not only true to original intent, but also, with a
tweak, has the flexibility to respond to modern realities of litigation
(the concern that animated the proposal to interpret the Seventh
Amendment in a way that accommodated a complexity exceptionlO 9 ).
The tweak would be that as the Court has long recognized, as new
108. See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 339-50 (1979) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting); Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 396-407 (1943) (Black,
J., dissenting).
109. See King, supra note 55.
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rights are created by Congress, Congress may append or not a right to
civil jury. Here, however, rather than repeat the mistake of the his-
torical test of looking for historical analogs, the interpretive rule
would be that since the right is new (i.e., was neither a right at com-
mon law or in equity in 1791), to be true to original intent, there is a
civil jury right unless Congress explicitly states there is not. Thus,
the Seventh Amendment should be understood to provide that any
contemporary civil case carries a jury right unless one of two situa-
tions applies: (1) it was within the scope of the chancery courts by
reference to the broadest definition as such courts existed in the
United States in 1791, or (2) the contemporary right sued upon is
newly created by Congress and explicitly does not carry a right to trial
by jury.
While my proposed interpretation of the Seventh Amendment (let
us call it the "Chancery test") is grounded in an understanding of the
justice system as it was in 1791, this proposal has an immediate ad-
vantage over the traditional historical test. The Chancery test avoids
the mental gymnastics of trying to view modern causes of action
through the lens of historical analogs. Rather, one looks at a particu-
lar Chancery court system, and says either a modern claim actually
existed in that system in 1791, or it did not. Under the traditional
historical test, as modern litigation strayed further and further from
1791 forms, one had to struggle for historical analogs because to do
otherwise was to narrow the scope of jury rights beyond recognition.
Under the Chancery test, the absence of searching for modern analogs
has the opposite result-it preserves and arguably expands jury
rights. That consequence is certainly more true to original intent.
I not only believe that this translation of "common law" is an ac-
ceptable alternative to my 1992 proposal, but also that it is the better
of the two. My 1992 interpretation translated "common law" as any
claim not created by statute. But as Alexander Hamilton described,
all of the States in eighteenth century America had some equity ac-
tions that did not carry a jury right.11o Thus, to translate "common
law" as "not statutory" creates a broader range of jury rights than one
can say, with confidence, was intended.111 Translating "common law"
as "not chancery," coupled with using the floor of the State with the
broadest chancery courts, avoids this dilemma.
Yet, the Chancery test is an incomplete proposal. For example,
proposing an alternative interpretation to the historical test, espe-
cially one which is also an historical test, does not resolve the problem
110. THE FEDERALIST No. 83, supra note 12, at 523-25.
111. In this regard, I believe Professor Krauss's critique of my 1992 approach, which
raises essentially this point, is well-taken. See Krauss, supra note 13, at 483
n.292.
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presented by Iqbal.1 12 But it is a separate article in itself to provide a
complete detailing of this proposal, including dealing with issues such
as whether a judge should ever be able to engage in fact weighing,
whether as a gate keeping function or as an element of the standard of
granting directed verdict or judgment NOV. The absence of that de-
tail here, however, is not an indictment of any alternative interpreta-
tion of the Seventh Amendment, or a basis to continue to adhere to the
current historical test.
D. The Advantages of Abandoning the Historical Test
The core proposal of this Article-abandoning the historical test-
has several advantages, whether my new interpretive paradigm is
adopted or not.
First, the passage of time has exposed the historical test. Surely
the kind of mental gymnastics we go through now in cases like
Markman113 and Grandfinancierall4 are not serving any jurispruden-
tial goals. There must be a better way.
Second, the very exercise of deciding how to best interpret the Sev-
enth Amendment today will force real and thoughtful revisiting as to
whether we still view juries as an important institution some two hun-
dred and twenty years later. England itself has largely eliminated
civil juries.115 The contemporary American conception of the impor-
tance of civil juries is largely divorced from the concerns that so
animated early Americans. It would be a productive exercise to re-
engage the public in an honest and introspective discussion of what
functions juries can serve, and whether society deems those functions,
on the whole, desirable. I do not presuppose the outcome of that pro-
cess. While there is much current criticism of the jury,1 16 it is possible
(perhaps even likely) that nonetheless the ultimate outcome could be
the same as in the eighteenth century, when the people valued their
112. In defense of my own proposal, however, I do conclude that, even at a glance, it
results in a far preferable intersection with Iqbal than does the current historical
test. The traditional historical test results in an unpredictable "hodge podge"
when trying to determine which procedures in which cases are constitutionally
permissible. Klein II, supra note 4, at 285. But there is a far greater approxima-
tion of black letter clarity when answering the dual questions: "Did Congress ex-
plicitly say this right does not have a jury right?" and "Did this cause of action
exist in the Chancery Courts of State X in 1791?" For this reason, under the
Chancery test there would be little ambiguity in knowing which cases could be
susceptible to a front-end plausibility review, and which ones would not. It is this
lack of clarity under the traditional historical test that is, to my mind, its ulti-
mate infirmity.
113. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
114. Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989).
115. Shapiro, supra note 39, at 443 n.4, 450.
116. Kenneth S. Klein, Unpacking the Jury Box, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 1325, 1328-59
(1996) [hereinafter Klein III].
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own abilities over that of judges. After all, there is also much criticism
of judges in contemporary America.117
Third, the abandonment of the historical test might remove a con-
stitutional impediment to the valuable introspection and debate over
plausibility pleading. The debate over what, as a matter of public pol-
icy, the pleading standard should be is a good and useful conversation.
But it is a dramatically incomplete debate, precisely because it is the
same conversation that animated the adoption of the Seventh Amend-
ment in the first place, and yet is occurring without reference to the
Seventh Amendment. A good deal of the reason eighteenth century
Americans cared so deeply about civil juries was an extension of their
views on the relative roles of government and citizenry to be the ulti-
mate deciders of private affairs. The debate over heightened fact
pleading standards is, in many ways, that same conversation. Elimi-
nating the historical test, and doing so explicitly because of the conse-
quence of Iqbal, forces the issue out in the open.
Finally, the Chancery test would eliminate the awkward exercise
of looking for historic analogs to contemporary forms of litigation-an
increasingly fictional enterprise. By changing the default position
from "no jury right" to "jury right," the need for this exercise
evaporates.
E. A Response to Anticipated Criticisms of Abandoning the
Historical Test
One could criticize this proposal as actually solving nothing. An
Iqbal pleading standard may be almost inescapably contradictory to
the intention of the Seventh Amendment. As reflected in the above
excerpted quotes contemporaneous with the consideration, drafting,
and adoption of the Seventh Amendment, one of the driving concerns
was not in preserving the right of civil litigants to a jury trial, but in
preserving the right of the citizenry-through the vehicle of the jury,
117. Indeed, in his dissent in Bush v. Gore, Justice Stevens famously asserted that the
majority opinion had to be premised on an assumption of general mistrust of the
competence of trial judges, which he asserted had now been endorsed by a major-
ity of the Supreme Court. 531 U.S. 98, 128-29 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("What must underlie petitioners' entire federal assault on the Florida election
procedures is an unstated lack of confidence in the impartiality and capacity of
the state judges who would make the critical decisions if the vote count were to
proceed. Otherwise, their position is wholly without merit. The endorsement of
that position by the majority of this Court can only lend credence to the most
cynical appraisal of the work of judges throughout the land. It is confidence in
the men and women who administer the judicial system that is the true backbone
of the rule of law. Time will one day heal the wound to that confidence that will
be inflicted by today's decision. One thing, however, is certain. Although we may
never know with complete certainty the identity of the winner of this year's Presi-
dential election, the identity of the loser is perfectly clear. It is the Nation's confi-
dence in the judge as an impartial guardian of the rule of law.").
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as opposed to the government through the vehicle of the judge-to be
the ultimate fact finder in common law civil disputes. 1i 8 As Professor
Wolfram, a noted scholar of the Seventh Amendment, wrote: "It is fa-
miliar legend that juries in civil cases were intended to guard private
litigants against the oppression ofjudges."ii 9 In reality, the Anti-Fed-
eralists, who were the driving force behind the amendment, wished to
interpose juries between judges and the general populace. i20 Yet
while the memory of this rationale for the Seventh Amendment has
faded, it has not been lost entirely, and is, from time to time, still reaf-
firmed by the Court.12 1
One would struggle to harmonize giving the judge the initial right
to evaluate the plausibility of facts, and yet preserving the intended
role of the jury as interjected in between the litigant and the govern-
ment in the evaluation of the facts. Thus, under any test used to in-
terpret the Seventh Amendment, plausibility pleading still may be
118. See, e.g., Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 209 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting)
("Primary among the precepts underlying the Constitution was that the people of
the time deeply feared and bitterly abhorred the existence of arbitrary, un-
checked power in the hands of any government official .... A great concern for
protecting individual liberty from even the possibility of irresponsible official ac-
tion was one of the momentous forces which led to the Bill of Rights. And
the... Seventh [Amendment was] directly and purposefully designed to confine
the power of courts and judges . .. ."); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 895
F.2d 218, 236 (5th Cir. 1990) (Rubin, J., dissenting) ("The Seventh Amendment
preserves the right of trial by jury.., thus interposing the civil jury as an impor-
tant constraint on the power of government."); Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. Ari-
zona, 738 F.2d 1021, 1029 (9th Cir. 1984) (the Seventh Amendment arose as a
consequence of "concern over the broad powers of federal government under the
new constitution."); Frank Irey, Jr., Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Comm'n, 519 F.2d 1200, 1208 (3d Cir. 1975) (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (the people
insisted upon the Seventh Amendment because they were "fearful of the aggran-
dizement of power in the national government"); Accord Parklane Hosiery Co. v.
Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 434-44 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 237 (1920)); 1 ALEXIS DE Toc-
QUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 285 (Phillips Bradley ed., 1945) ("I do not
know whether the jury is useful to those who have lawsuits, but I am sure it is
highly beneficial to those who judge them."). See also Akhil Reed Amar,
Reinventing Juries: Ten Suggested Reforms, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1169, 1169-72
(1995); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights As a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J.
1131, 1187-89 (1991) [hereineafter Amar II]. See generally, Klein III, supra note
116, at 1336-41.
119. Wolfram, supra note 5, at 708.
120. Id. at 670-72. See also Amar II, supra note 118, at 1182-99 (discussing the jury
in the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Amendments, the historical importance of the
jury, the role of the jury in government, and the ability to waive a jury trial in
criminal cases). Professor Amar also discusses other rationales that he believes
complemented the populism rationale. Id. But see Robert C. Palmer, Akhil
Amar: Elitist Populist and Anti-Textual Textualist, 16 S. ILL. U. L.J. 397, 408-14
(1992).
121. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 406-07 (1991). Accord Vikram David Amar, Jury
Service as Political Participation Akin to Voting, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 203 (1995).
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unconstitutional. This criticism does not save the historical test, but
rather it just changes the terms of the debate. The conversation about
the desirability of a plausibility pleading standard would have to in-
corporate a topic heretofore ignored in that context-the degree to
which we share the view of our forbearers regarding the desirability of
protecting the historic province of the jury.1 2 2
Another criticism might be that the historical test has been the
rule of law for roughly two hundred years, and so should be a settled
matter for that reason. I will not rehash the many reasons for giving
deference, but not blind unquestioning deference, to stare decisis. It
does bear noting, however, that for decades in key Seventh Amend-
ment decisions, dissenting Justices have questioned whether the his-
torical test is getting increasingly more lip service than adherence.123
Perhaps of equal importance, stare decisis simply should not trump
bad law.
A related criticism might be that indeed the accusation in the dis-
sent in Parklane Hosiery is correct-the Court has lately just been
paying lip service to the historical test, and thus already has long ago
abandoned it. Here, the response is that if this is so, then the replace-
ment has been that the Court is now acting on intuition on a case by
case basis. This defeats the time honored value of predictability in the
law.
Yet another criticism could be that the Chancery test would make
it very difficult to create new causes of action that did not carry a jury
right. My response is simple-that is exactly the result the Seventh
Amendment intended.
Finally, one might argue seeing Iqbal as the catalyst to jettison the
historical test but without doing so in a way that solves the constitu-
tional problems with Iqbal is the quintessential instance of the tail
wagging the dog. To these critics, I would say that the historical test
has been flawed from its inception. The correct metaphor is that one
hopes it is the straw that breaks the camel's back. The Court should
have abandoned it long ago. If the consequence, albeit unintended, of
Iqbal is to force the issue, then so much the better. In other words, I
do not propose that Iqbal forces us to a regrettable but inescapable
loss of an otherwise valuable and cherished rule of law. Rather, I see
this as the necessary application of the special category of appropri-
ate, "high time."
122. For a discussion, and possible explanation, of the eroding public support ofjuries,
see Klein III, supra note 116.
123. See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 339-50 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Gallo-
way v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 396-407 (1943) (Black, J., dissenting).
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V. CONCLUSION
Time and dust should not morph myth into value. Our Founders
were politicians, who sometimes cut political deals to solve political
problems. That such a solution is described in the text of the Consti-
tution should neither obscure its origins, nor impair contemporary ju-
risprudence. Let us now, finally, put the myth of the historical test to
bed.
